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Energy Group Buying with Loading Sharing for
Green Cellular Networks
Jie Xu, Lingjie Duan, and Rui Zhang
Abstract—In the emerging hybrid electricity market, mobile
network operators (MNOs) of cellular networks can make day-
ahead energy purchase commitments at low prices and real-time
flexible energy purchase at high prices. To minimize electricity
bills, it is essential for MNOs to jointly optimize the day-
ahead and real-time energy purchase based on their time-varying
wireless traffic load. In this paper, we consider two different
MNOs coexisting in the same area, and exploit their collaboration
in both energy purchase and wireless load sharing for energy cost
saving. Specifically, we propose a new approach named energy
group buying with load sharing, in which the two MNOs are
aggregated as a single group to make the day-ahead and real-
time energy purchase, and their base stations (BSs) share the
wireless traffic to maximally turn lightly-loaded BSs into sleep
mode. When the two MNOs belong to the same entity and
aim to minimize their total energy cost, we use the two-stage
stochastic programming to obtain the optimal day-ahead and
real-time energy group buying jointly with wireless load sharing.
When the two MNOs belong to different entities and are self-
interested in minimizing their individual energy costs, we propose
a novel repeated Nash bargaining scheme for them to negotiate
and share their energy costs under energy group buying and
load sharing. Our proposed repeated Nash bargaining scheme is
shown to achieve Pareto-optimal and fair energy cost reductions
for both MNOs.
Index Terms—Cellular networks, hybrid electricity market,
energy group buying, loading sharing, repeated Nash bargaining.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet the explosive wireless traffic growth driven by
the popularity of new mobile devices (e.g., smart phones and
tablets) and new mobile applications (such as social network-
ing), the fifth-generation (5G) cellular technology has recently
attracted a lot of research interests from both academia and
industry (see, e.g., [1]–[3]). It is expected that 5G should
achieve roughly 1000 times data rate increase as compared to
its fourth-generation (4G) counterpart. However, the growing
data throughput will lead to large energy consumption and
high electricity bills for mobile network operators (MNOs).
For example, the total energy cost of China Mobile, a Chinese
state-owned telecommunication company, is almost 3 billion
US dollars in the year of 2011 [4], and is still increasing
considerably year by year. Therefore, how to reduce the
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energy cost of cellular networks while ensuring subscribers’
growing communication requirements is very important for
the technological and economical success of 5G, and it is
predicted in [1] that the energy cost per bit will need to fall
by at least 100 times for 5G.
Recently, the electricity grids are also experiencing a
paradigm shift from conventional grids to smart grids [5],
[6]. Unlike conventional grids using fixed energy pricing, the
newly deployed smart grids enable grid operators to charge
time-varying prices to cope with electricity consumers’ time-
varying load, thus helping stabilize the energy generation and
transmission [5]. Specifically, a hybrid electricity market of
smart grids has been successfully implemented in more and
more countries (such as United States and Norway [7], [8]),
and such a hybrid market combines a day-ahead energy market
and a real-time energy market. In the day-ahead energy market,
electricity consumers can make commitment on tomorrow’s
energy purchase at low prices; whereas in the real-time energy
market, they are free from commitment and can flexibly
buy energy at high prices or sell back the excessive energy
commitment at prices lower than the day-ahead ones. In
view of the new hybrid electricity market, it is essential for
MNOs to jointly optimize the day-ahead and real-time energy
purchase based on their time-varying wireless traffic load, for
the purpose of minimizing their energy costs.
In this paper, we consider a scenario with coexisting MNOs
in the same area,1 in which each MNO participates in the day-
ahead and real-time energy markets as an electricity consumer,
and operates a number of cellular base stations (BSs) to
serve their respective subscribers. Under such a scenario,
MNOs face two key challenges. First, it may happen that one
MNO over-commits while another under-commits the day-
ahead energy purchase, thus leading to additional expense
in real-time energy trading. Second, cellular BSs of each
MNO, which are deployed to meet the peak wireless traffic
loads, are under-utilized during the non-peak traffic hours.
The under-utilization results in energy inefficiency due to the
non-transmission power consumption at BSs for maintaining
the routine operation and ensuring the coverage [9]–[11]. To
overcome the two challenges, we are motivated to exploit the
collaboration benefit in both energy purchase and wireless load
sharing among different MNOs for their energy cost saving.
For the purpose of exposition, in this paper we investigate
the collaborative operation of two coexisting MNOs in a daily
time horizon including a number of time slots. It is assumed
1One practical example of such a scenario is the coexistence of different
state-owned MNOs (i.e., China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom)
in China.
2that the real-time energy prices and the BSs’ wireless traffic
demands are time-varying and can only be partially predicted
day-ahead with certain prediction errors. Under this setup,
we jointly optimize the day-ahead energy commitment and
real-time energy trading at the two MNOs together with their
wireless load sharing, so as to minimize their energy costs. To
our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to investi-
gate the cost-efficient operation of cooperative MNOs in the
hybrid energy market, and our proposed energy optimization
framework for cellular networks by taking into account the
new smart grid features is important to help MNOs meet the
100 times energy cost decrease for 5G. The main results of
this paper are summarized as follows.
• Individual energy buying in the hybrid electricity market.
As a benchmark, we first consider the non-cooperative
case when two traditional MNOs operate independently
to minimize their individual energy costs. We use the two-
stage stochastic programming to obtain the optimal day-
ahead energy commitment and real-time energy trading
for individuals. It is shown that when the day-ahead
energy price is larger than the average of the real-time
energy buying and selling prices in a particular time slot,
it is beneficial for the MNO to under-commit its predicted
energy demand for this slot; otherwise the MNO will
over-commit.
• Energy group buying with load sharing for fully-
cooperative MNOs. Next, we consider the fully-
cooperative case when the two MNOs belong to the same
entity (like Sprint and T-Mobile merged in some states
of US [12]) and minimize their total energy cost. We
propose a new approach named energy group buying with
load sharing, in which the two MNOs are aggregated
as a single group to make the day-ahead and real-time
energy purchase, and their BSs share the wireless traffic
to maximally turn lightly-loaded BSs into sleep mode.
By jointly optimizing the day-ahead and real-time energy
group buying as well as the load sharing via the two-stage
stochastic programming, the total energy cost of the two
MNOs is significantly reduced as compared to the non-
cooperative benchmark.
• Repeated Nash bargaining scheme for self-interested
MNOs. Finally, when the two MNOs belong to different
entities and are self-interested in minimizing their indi-
vidual energy costs, we propose a novel repeated Nash
bargaining scheme for them to negotiate and share their
energy costs under energy group buying and load sharing.
This scheme includes two stages: in stage I, the two
MNOs negotiate about their day-ahead aggregated energy
purchase commitment by taking into account the real-
time collaboration benefit in the future; while in stage
II, the two MNOs negotiate about their real-time energy
group buying as well as their wireless load sharing over
time. Our proposed repeated Nash bargaining scheme is
shown to achieve Pareto-optimal and fair energy cost
reductions for both MNOs.
In the literature, there have been existing studies investigat-
ing the energy purchase of electricity consumers in the hybrid
electricity market [8], [13], in which the energy demands of
consumers are assumed to be given. There have also been some
works studying the load sharing in a single wireless network
(see, e.g., [14]–[16] and the references therein). In [14], [15],
lightly-loaded BSs are allowed to offload their wireless traffic
to co-located or nearby BSs with overlapped coverage, such
that they can be turned to sleep mode for energy saving. In
[16], load sharing between cellular BSs and WiFi access points
(APs) is utilized to improve the payoffs of both the MNO
(cellular BSs’ owner) and the APs’ owner.
In addition, there have been a handful of works [17]–
[24] investigating the cellular networks powered by smart
grids. In [17], [18], the authors developed joint optimization
frameworks to maximize the utilities of both energy networks
and cellular networks. In [19]–[23], the authors considered an
energy cooperation technique to improve the cost efficiency
of cellular networks, in which distributed BSs are allowed
to exchange their locally available (renewable) energy via
leveraging two-way energy flows in smart grid infrastructures.
In [24], the authors considered the two-way energy trading
between BSs and smart grids, in which the difference between
energy buying and selling prices is exploited to reduce the
energy cost at BSs. However, these prior works have not con-
sidered the hybrid electricity market that has been practically
implemented in many countries, and have only focused on a
single MNO case where the BSs are cooperative in nature
and can be controlled by a centralizer. In contrast, this paper
investigates the practical scenario with more than one self-
interested MNOs in the hybrid electricity market, and provides
incentive designs to motivate the inter-MNO collaboration.
Furthermore, by borrowing insights from economics (e.g.,
[25]), this is also the first paper to leverage group buying
to exploit the collaboration benefit between two MNOs for
energy cost saving in the hybrid electricity market, which
also requires wireless load sharing between different MNOs
as demand management to fit the aggregated supply.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the hybrid electricity market and wireless traffic
models. Section III considers the non-cooperative case when
the two MNOs operate independently to minimize their in-
dividual energy costs. Section IV proposes the energy group
buying with load sharing to minimize the total energy cost
of the two MNOs when they are fully-cooperative. Section
V develops a novel repeated Nash bargaining scheme for
two self-interested MNOs to share their energy costs under
energy group buying and load sharing. Section VI shows the
simulation results. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider two MNOs coexisting over the same geo-
graphic area (e.g., China Mobile and China Unicom in China)
as shown in Fig. 1. In the upper layer for energy buying in Fig.
1, each MNO participates in the hybrid electricity market as a
consumer. In the lower layer for wireless load sharing in Fig. 1,
each MNO operates a total of K BSs within the area of interest
to serve the respective subscribers. It is assumed that the kth
BSs from the two MNOs (which are denoted by BSs k1 and
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Fig. 1. System model with two MNOs coexisting in the same area, where
each MNO purchases energy from the hybrid electricity market, and operates
a number of BSs to serve subscribers.
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Fig. 2. Day-ahead energy commitment and real-time energy trading of MNO
i over time.
k2 for MNOs 1 and 2, respectively) are geographically close
or co-located to cover the same sub-area,2 k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
and as a result, their wireless traffic can be shared/offloaded
with each other. In practice, the pairing of BSs can be formed
by the two MNOs to exchange the geographic locations of
their BSs.
Due to our modeling of the hybrid electricity market in-
cluding both the day-ahead and real-time energy purchase,
we are interested in a finite horizon of each day consisting
of N > 1 time slots (each having a length of hours or
tens of minutes). We consider quasi-static energy price and
wireless traffic models, in which energy prices in the electricity
market and wireless traffic at each BS remain constant within
each time slot but may change from one slot to another. For
notational convenience, we assume the length of each time
slot is normalized to unity and thus we will use the terms
“energy” and “power” interchangeably throughout this paper
unless otherwise stated.
A. Hybrid Electricity Market
First, consider the upper layer for energy buying in Fig. 1.
In the hybrid electricity market, each MNO i makes decisions
2In practice, different MNOs in China have agreed to jointly establish
a telecommunications tower company, which will deploy shared tower in-
frastructures (cell sites including physical space, rooftops, towers, masts and
pylons) to enable the co-location of individually deployed BSs by different
MNOs [26], [35]. Note that our results can be extended to the case when the
neighboring or paired BSs have partially overlapping coverage, by allowing
more sophisticated wireless load sharing among them (e.g., each BS in one
MNO may share traffic with multiple nearby BSs in the other MNO).
on the day-ahead energy commitment and real-time energy
trading over time as shown in Fig. 2, for which the detailes
are explained as follows.
• Energy purchase commitment in the day-ahead market:
In day-ahead (before the N -slot time horizon, e.g., be-
fore 4 pm of the previous day in the PJM day-ahead
energy market [7]), each MNO makes its energy purchase
commitment for the following N time slots based on
its predicted energy demands. Let Gi,n ≥ 0 denote the
energy commitment by MNO i ∈ {1, 2} for time slot
n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and αn > 0 denote the corresponding
day-ahead energy price for time slot n. In practice, the
energy price αn’s in general vary over different time
slots (see Fig. 3), and are announced by the power grid
operator to the two MNOs in day-ahead.
• Energy trading in the real-time market: The day-ahead
energy commitments at each MNO may differ from
its exact real-time energy demands. To overcome such
mismatches, each MNO can buy the energy deficit or
sell back the energy surplus in the real-time energy
market. Let GBi,n ≥ 0 and GSi,n ≥ 0 denote the energy
bought from or sold back to the real-time market by
MNO i in time slot n, and αBn ≥ 0 and αSn ≥ 0
denote the corresponding real-time energy buying and
selling prices, respectively. In each time slot n, the real-
time energy buying and selling prices are higher and
lower than the day-ahead energy price, respectively, i.e.,
αSn < αn < α
B
n , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} (see Fig. 3), such
that electricity consumers will pay additional cost for the
deviation of their real-time energy demands from the day-
ahead commitments [8]. It is assumed that the real-time
energy prices αBn and αSn are announced at the beginning
of time slot n in real-time but can only be partially
predicted by MNOs in day-ahead with certain prediction
errors. Let the predicted energy prices in day-ahead be
denoted as α¯Bn and α¯Sn , respectively. Then we model the
actual real-time energy buying and selling prices as
αBn = α¯
B
n + δ
B
n ,
αSn = α¯
S
n + δ
S
n ,
where δBn and δSn denote the prediction errors for the
real-time energy buying and selling prices, both of which
are modeled as random variables with zero mean and
general probability density functions (PDFs) ψBn (δBn ) and
ψSn (δ
S
n ), respectively. δBn ’s and δSn ’s are assumed to be
independent of each other.
By combining the above day-ahead energy commitment and
real-time energy trading, the exact energy purchased by MNO
i in time slot n is given by Gi,n + GBi,n − GSi,n, and the
corresponding energy cost of MNO i in time slot n is denoted
as
Ci,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n) = αnGi,n + α
B
nG
B
i,n − α
S
nG
S
i,n,
i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (1)
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Fig. 3. Day-ahead energy price {αn} and real-time energy buying and
selling prices {αBn } and {αSn} over one day, where {αn} are set based on
the practical day-ahead energy prices from PJM on March 01, 2015 [27].
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Fig. 4. Normalized wireless traffic at a particular BS over one day, which
is based on the measurement results from practical cellular BSs [28].
B. Wireless Traffic Modeling and Sharing/Offloading at BSs
Next, consider the lower layer for wireless load sharing in
Fig. 1. We first introduce the wireless traffic models at cellular
BSs. In time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let Dki,n > 0 denote the
actual wireless traffic requested by the subscribers of MNO
i ∈ {1, 2} under the coverage sub-area of BS k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
In general, Dki,n’s fluctuate considerably over time, as shown
in Fig. 4. It is assumed that the wireless traffic Dki,n’s, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, are perfectly known by MNO i at the
beginning of time slot n, but can only be partially predicted
in day-ahead with certain prediction errors. Let D¯ki,n denote
the predictable wireless traffic in day-ahead at BS k of MNO
i (or BS ki) for time slot n. Then we have
Dki,n = D¯ki,n + ξki,n, (2)
where ξki,n denotes the corresponding wireless traffic pre-
diction error, which is modeled as a random variable with
zero mean and a general PDF φki,n(ξki,n). The distribution
φki,n(ξki,n)’s are assumed to be known by the MNO, which
can be practically obtained via gathering the historical data
about the predicted and exact wireless traffic. Note that ξki,n’s
are assumed to be independent of each other and also inde-
pendent of the energy price prediction error δSn ’s and δBn ’s.
Next, we present the wireless load sharing between the two
MNOs. For each kth paired BSs from the two MNOs with the
same covered sub-area (i.e., BSs k1 and k2), their wireless
traffic can be shared/offloaded with each other (subject to
maximum supportable wireless traffic as specified later), and
after the load sharing, one of the two BSs (e.g., the lightly
loaded one) may be turned into sleep mode. Note that the
practical implementation of wireless load sharing between
such paired BSs requires their subscribed mobile devices to be
equipped with wireless interfaces used by both MNOs (e.g.,
one MNO uses new 5G techniques while the other MNO
uses 4G LTE), which is reasonable for future smart phones
and tablets.3 Also note that when the BS of one MNO is
turned into sleep mode, the paired BS of the other MNO
should ensure the coverage in the corresponding sub-area,
where subscribers in the former MNO should be roamed to
the latter MNO. Let the offloaded traffic from BS ki to BS kı¯
in time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} be denoted by xki,n ≥ 0, where
ı¯ ∈ {1, 2}\{i} with i ∈ {1, 2}. Then the wireless traffic served
by BS ki in time slot n is given by
dki,n = Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n. (3)
Practically, due to the transmission power and bandwidth
limitations, each cellular BS ki has a maximum supportable
wireless traffic, which is denoted by Dmaxki > 0. As a result,
we have
dki,n ≤ D
max
ki
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(4)
Note that the requested traffic load Dki,n is assumed to
be less than Dmaxki by default, i.e., Dki,n ≤ D
max
ki
, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, since otherwise the
service requests from subscribers would be denied due to the
radio access control at BSs.
Based on the served wireless traffic, we then present the
energy consumption models at BSs. For a typical cellular BS,
when it is in the active mode, its energy consumption consists
of two parts [10]. The first part is the transmission energy
consumption due to e.g. radio-frequency (RF) chains, which
is related to the served wireless traffic at that BS. Specifically,
we consider a linear transmission energy consumption model
by defining the transmission energy consumed by BS ki as
a product akidki,n in time slot n, where aki > 0 denotes
the rate of the energy consumption with respect to the traffic
load. Here, the linear transmission energy consumption model
is consistent with the measurement results in [11]. The second
part is the non-transmission energy consumption due to e.g. air
conditioner and data processor, which is defined as a constant
bki > 0 for BS ki. On the other hand, when there is no wireless
traffic served at the BS (i.e., dki,n = 0), it can be turned into
the sleep mode for power saving by switching off some of
its components, for which the energy consumption is denoted
by cki ≥ 0 with cki ≪ bki , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}. By
combining the active and sleep modes, the energy consumption
3For example, nowadays iPhone 6 can support almost all cellular techniques
including GSM/EDGE, CDMA EV-DO, UMTS/HSPA, TD-SCDMA, FDD-
LTE, and TD-LTE [29].
5model for BS ki is expressed as
Pki(dki,n) =
{
akidki,n + bki , if dki,n > 0
cki , if dki,n = 0
,
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
Here, the parameters aki ’s, bki ’s, and cki’s can in general vary
over BSs and MNOs because of different types of BSs and
cellular techniques employed. Some typical values about these
parameters can be referred to in [9].
C. Problem Statement
Our objective is to minimize the sum energy cost
of each MNO i ∈ {1, 2} over the N time slots,
i.e.,
∑N
n=1 Ci,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n) with Ci,n(Gi,n, GBi,n, GSi,n)
given in (1), while ensuring the wireless traffic requirements at
BSs in each time slot n. Here, the wireless traffic requirement
in time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} can be specified as the following
constraint:
Gi,n +G
B
i,n −G
S
i,n ≥
K∑
k=1
Pki(Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n), (6)
where the left-hand-side (LHS) denotes the purchased energy
by MNO i from the electricity market in time slot n, which
should be no smaller than the total energy requirements at
all K BSs of MNO i, as given in the right-hand-side (RHS)
based on (3) and (5). The decision variables include the day-
ahead energy commitment {Gi,n}, the real-time energy trading
{GBi,n} and {GSi,n}, and the wireless loading sharing {xki,n}.
III. NO COOPERATION BENCHMARK
In this section, we focus on the benchmark case when
there is no cooperation between two traditional MNOs. In
this case, the two MNOs operate independently without any
wireless load sharing, i.e., xki,n = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈
{1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, from (3) and (5), the served
wireless traffic and energy demand of BS ki in time slot n
are dki,n = Dki,n > 0 and Pki(Dki,n) = akiDki,n + bki ,
respectively.
We investigate the day-ahead and real-time energy purchase
at each MNO to minimize its individual energy cost while en-
suring the corresponding wireless traffic requirements. Without
loss of generality, we focus on a particular MNO i ∈ {1, 2}.
As shown in Fig. 2, MNO i makes energy commitment
{Gi,n} in day-ahead (based on uncertain predictions of real-
time energy prices and wireless traffic demands), and decides
energy trading GBi,n and GSi,n at each time slot n in real-
time. Since the decisions are made at different time, we
formulate the individual energy cost minimization as a two-
stage stochastic programming problem. In stage I (day-ahead),
MNO i decides its day-ahead energy purchase commitment
(i.e., {Gi,n}) to minimize the expected sum energy cost over
the N time slots, i.e.,
min
{Gi,n≥0}
E
( N∑
n=1
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
, (7)
where the expectation is over the real-time energy price pre-
diction error δBn ’s and δSn ’s, and the wireless traffic prediction
error ξki,n’s. Here, C∗i,n(Gi,n) denotes the minimum energy
cost under given Gi,n in each time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} in
stage II (real-time), which is achieved via optimizing the real-
time energy trading (i.e., GBi,n and GSi,n). That is,
C∗i,n(Gi,n) = min
GB
i,n
≥0,GS
i,n
≥0
Ci,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n)
s.t. Gi,n +G
B
i,n −G
S
i,n ≥
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki). (8)
In (8), the constraint on the wireless traffic requirement follows
from (6) together with xki,n = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈
{1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Note that in stage II, each MNO
i implements the real-time energy cost minimization in (8)
independently for each time slot n (see Fig. 2), since it can
only acquire the exact real-time energy price αBn and αSn and
wireless traffic demand Dki,n’s at the beginning of that time
slot.
In the following, we employ the backward induction to
solve this two-stage stochastic programming problem, by first
obtaining the real-time energy trading solution in stage II
(under any given {Gi,n}) and then deriving the day-ahead
energy commitment solution in stage I.
A. Real-Time Energy Trading in Stage II
First, we consider the real-time energy trading for MNO
i in stage II under any given day-ahead energy purchase
commitment Gi,n’s. Since the MNO makes the real-time
trading independently over different time slots, we solve the
problem in (8) by considering any one particular time slot
n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Problem (8) is indeed a simple linear program (LP), for
which we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: The optimal solution to problem (8) under
given Gi,n is given by
GB∗i,n(Gi,n) = max
( K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki)−Gi,n, 0
)
(9)
GS∗i,n(Gi,n) = max
(
Gi,n −
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki), 0
)
, (10)
which achieves the minimum real-time energy cost of MNO
i in time slot n as
C∗i,n(Gi,n) =


(αn − α
B
n )Gi,n + α
B
n
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki),
if Gi,n ≤
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki)
(αn − α
S
n)Gi,n + α
S
n
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki),
if Gi,n >
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki).
(11)
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Fig. 5. An example function C∗i,n(Gi,n).
Proof: The optimal solution GB∗i,n(Gi,n) and GS∗i,n(Gi,n)
in (9) and (10) can be easily obtained by solving the simple
LP in (8). Then, substituting (9) and (10) into the objective
function of problem (8), C∗i,n(Gi,n) in (11) can be obtained.
In Lemma 3.1, the optimal solution in (9) and (10) intu-
itively means that if the day-ahead energy commitment Gi,n is
more than the real-time energy demand
∑K
k=1(akiDki,n+bki)
of the K BSs in the network, then MNO i needs to buy the
energy deficit from the real-time energy market; otherwise,
MNO i needs to sell back the excessive energy to the real-
time energy market. It is evident from (9) and (10) that
GB∗i,n(Gi,n) and GS∗i,n(Gi,n) cannot be positive at the same
time, i.e., GB∗i,n(Gi,n)·GS∗i,n(Gi,n) = 0. This means that it is not
cost-effective for MNO i to buy and sell energy at the same
time in the real-time market. Furthermore, it can be shown
that C∗i,n(Gi,n) is a convex function with respect to the day-
ahead energy commitment Gi,n over Gi,n ≥ 0, provided that
αn−α
B
n < 0 and αn−αSn > 0 (see an example of C∗i,n(Gi,n)
in Fig. 5).
B. Day-Ahead Energy Commitment in Stage I
After obtaining the optimal real-time energy trading
{GB∗i,n(Gi,n)} and {GS∗i,n(Gi,n)} in stage II, we then investigate
stage I to obtain the optimal day-ahead energy commitment
{Gi,n}, denoted by {G∗i,n}, to solve problem (7).
It is observed in problem (7) that the variables {Gi,n} are
decoupling with each other, and as a result, problem (7) can
be decomposed into the following N sub-problems, each for
one time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
min
Gi,n≥0
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
) (12)
Problem (12) can be shown to be convex, since the objective
function E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
) (with expectation over the prediction
error δBn ’s, δ
S
n ’s, and ξki,n’s) is convex with respect to Gi,n
overGi,n ≥ 0, provided that C∗i,n(Gi,n) is convex overGi,n ≥
0 under any given δBn ’s, δSn ’s, and ξki,n’s [30]. However,
standard convex optimization techniques cannot be directly
applied to solve (12), since the function E (C∗i,n(Gi,n)) cannot
be computed exactly in general. To overcome this issue, we
employ the stochastic subgradient method [31] to solve this
problem as follows by first presenting the exact subgradient
of E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
, then using the Monte Carlo method to
approximate the subgradient, and finally applying the bisection
method.
First, we show the exact subgradient of E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
by
denoting the energy demand of MNO i in time slot n as ζi,n =∑K
k=1(akiDki,n + bki), which is a random variable with the
PDF given by fi,n(ζi,n).4 Then we have
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
= (αn − α¯
S
n)Gi,n
∫ ∞
Gi,n
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n
+ (αn − α¯
B
n )Gi,n
∫ Gi,n
0
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n
+ α¯Sn
∫ ∞
Gi,n
ζi,nfi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n
+ α¯Bn
∫ Gi,n
0
ζi,nfi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n, (13)
Note that E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
is only related to the predicted
real-time energy price α¯Sn and α¯Bn , but independent of the
prediction error δSn ’s and δBn ’s, due to the fact that δSn ’s and
δBn ’s are of zero mean. From (13), the exact subgradient of
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
can be obtained as
gi,n(Gi,n) =(αn − α¯
S
n)
∫ ∞
Gi,n
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n
+ (αn − α¯
B
n )
∫ Gi,n
0
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n. (14)
Here, gi,n(Gi,n) cannot be obtained directly due to the fact
that the PDF fi,n(ζi,n) cannot be computed exactly in general.
Next, we use the Monte Carlo method to obtain an approx-
imation of the subgradient gi,n(Gi,n), denoted by gˆi,n(Gi,n).
Specifically, based on the PDF φki,n(ξki,n)’s, we randomly
generate M independent samples of the wireless traffic pre-
diction errors
{
ξ
(m)
ki,n
}
,m = 1, . . . ,M , and accordingly
compute the corresponding M energy demands as ζ(m)i,n =∑K
k=1(aki(D¯ki,n + ξ
(m)
ki,n
) + bki),m = 1, . . . ,M . Then we
have the approximate subgradient as
gˆi,n(Gi,n) =
1
M
(
(αn − α¯
S
n)
M∑
m=1
1
ζ
(m)
i,n
>Gi,n
+ (αn − α¯
B
n )
M∑
m=1
1
ζ
(m)
i,n
≤Gi,n
)
,
where 1A denotes the indicator function of an event A, with
1A = 1 if A is true, and 1A = 0 otherwise. Evidently, when
M is sufficiently large, the approximate subgradient is a good
estimate of the exact one, i.e., gˆi,n(Gi,n) ≈ gi,n(Gi,n).
Finally, we use the bisection method [30] based on the
approximate subgradient gˆi,n(Gi,n) to obtain the optimal day-
ahead energy commitment solution G∗i,n to problem (12)
numerically. After acquiring the solution G∗i,n to (12) for
n = 1 . . . , N , problem (7) in stage I is solved.
4As defined in (2), we have Dki,n = D¯ki,n + ξki,n with the prediction
error ξki,n’s being random variables. As a result, ζi,n is also a random
variable, whose PDF fi,n(ζi,n) can be obtained based on the PDFs of ξki,n’s(i.e., φki,n(ξki,n)’s).
7To provide more insights on the optimal day-ahead energy
trading, we have the following proposition by considering a
special case of symmetric wireless traffic prediction errors
(i.e., φki,n(ξki,n) = φki,n(−ξki,n), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈
{1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}).
Proposition 3.1: For the optimal day-ahead energy commit-
ment of MNO i in time slot n, it follows that
• If αn = (α¯Bn + α¯Sn)/2, then G∗i,n =
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n +
bki);
• If αn > (α¯Bn + α¯Sn)/2, then G∗i,n <
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n +
bki);
• Otherwise, G∗i,n >
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 intuitively shows that when the day-ahead
energy price is larger than the average of the predicted real-
time energy buying and selling prices, it is beneficial for the
MNO to under-commit its predicted energy demand; while
otherwise, it is desirable for the MNO to over-commit.
IV. FULL COOPERATION THROUGH ENERGY GROUP
BUYING AND WIRELESS LOAD SHARING
In this section, we consider that the two MNOs are cooper-
ative in nature (e.g., belonging to the same entity like Sprint
and T-Mobile merged in some states of US [12]), and fully
cooperate in minimizing their total energy cost. Specifically,
we propose a new approach named energy group buying
associated with wireless load sharing, as described in detail
as follows.
A. Problem Formulation with Energy Group Buying
Energy group buying is an approach that allows the two
MNOs to share their day-ahead energy commitments and real-
time energy trading. This approach is implemented with the
assistance of an aggregator (see Fig. 1), which is an entity
commonly employed in smart girds to aggregate and control
the demands at different electricity consumers (e.g., BSs of
the two MNOs here) [32]. Via signing a contract with the
aggregator, the two MNOs’ BSs can be aggregated as a single
group, and the aggregator can serve as an intermediary party
to control the group of BSs to purchase energy from the
hybrid electricity market. For convenience, under the energy
group buying, we denote Gn ≥ 0 as the aggregated day-ahead
energy purchase commitment for the two MNOs in time slot
n, and GBn ≥ 0 and GSn ≥ 0 as the aggregated real-time
energy buying and selling amounts, respectively. Accordingly,
the wireless traffic requirements at the two MNOs in (6) can
be combined as
Gn +G
B
n −G
S
n ≥
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki (Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n) ,
(15)
which means that the aggregated energy purchase of the two
MNOs should be no smaller than the total energy demands
of their BSs (with load sharing). Note that we also have the
following energy group buying constraints for the two MNOs
to share the day-ahead and real-time energy purchase.
G1,n +G2,n = Gn, ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} (16)
GB1,n +G
B
2,n = G
B
n , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} (17)
GS1,n +G
S
2,n = G
S
n , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} (18)
Accordingly, the total energy cost of the two MNOs in time
slot n is expressed as
CTC,n(Gn, G
B
n , G
S
n) =
2∑
i=1
Ci,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n)
= αnGn + α
B
nG
B
n − α
S
nG
S
n , (19)
where Ci,n(Gi,n, GBi,n, GSi,n) is the energy cost of MNO i in
time slot n as given in (1).
Next, we consider the total energy cost minimization prob-
lem for the two MNOs. Similar to the non-cooperative case
(see Fig. 2), the day-ahead and real-time energy group buying
decisions are made at different time. Therefore, we formulate
the total energy cost minimization problem as a two-stage
stochastic programming problem. In stage I (day-ahead), the
two MNOs decide their day-ahead energy group buying (i.e.,
{Gn}) to minimize their expected sum energy cost over the
N time slots:5
min
{Gn≥0}
E
( N∑
n=1
C∗∗TC,n(Gn)
)
. (20)
Here, C∗∗TC,n(Gn) denotes the minimum total energy cost
under given Gn in each time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} in stage
II (real-time), which is achieved via optimizing the real-time
energy group buying (i.e., GBn and GSn) as well as the wireless
load sharing (i.e., {xki,n}), i.e.,
C∗∗TC,n(Gn) = min
GBn ,G
S
n,{xki,n}
CTC,n(Gn, G
B
n , G
S
n) (21)
s.t. Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n ≤ D
max
ki
,
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2} (22)
GBn ≥ 0, G
S
n ≥ 0, xki,n ≥ 0,
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2} (23)
(15).
It is worth noting that since we focus on the total energy cost
in this section, only energy group buying decision variables
{Gn}, {G
B
n }, and {GSn} are of interest. In other words, under
given energy group buying, any individual energy purchase
variables {Gi,n}, {GBi,n}, and {GSi,n} satisfying (16), (17),
and (18) are feasible to achieve the same total energy cost.
In the following, we solve the two-stage stochastic program-
ming problem via the backward induction by first investigating
stage II under any given day-ahead energy group buying {Gn}
and then studying stage I.
5We use the superscript ∗∗ to denote the optimal solution for the fully-
cooperative case in this section, to distinguish from the superscript ∗ for the
non-cooperative case in Section III.
8B. Real-Time Energy Group Buying and Load Sharing in
Stage II
First, we consider the real-time energy group buying and
wireless load sharing at the two MNOs in stage II under any
given day-ahead energy group buying {Gn}. Since the real-
time decisions are made from one slot to another indepen-
dently, we focus on solving problem (21) for a particular time
slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} without loss of generality.
Problem (21) is not a convex optimization problem, since
the constraint in (15) is non-convex due to the non-convexity
of the energy consumption function Pki (·)’s in (5). Despite
this, we can still find the optimal solution to this problem
by exploiting its specific structure. In the following, we first
derive the optimal load sharing solution and then obtain the
optimal real-time energy group buying solution.
1) Optimal Load Sharing Solution: It is observed that
the objective of problem (21) (i.e., the total energy cost
of the two MNOs) is monotonically increasing as a func-
tion of the total energy demand of the two MNOs (i.e.,∑2
i=1
∑K
k=1 Pki (Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n)). As a result, the op-
timal load sharing solution can be obtained by minimizing the
total energy demand of the two MNOs, i.e.,
min
{xki,n≥0}
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki (Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n)
s.t. Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n ≤ D
max
ki
,
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}. (24)
Since xki,n’s are decoupling over different BS pair k’s in
both the objective function and constraints, problem (24)
can be decomposed into K subproblems as follows, each
corresponding to the total energy consumption minimization
for the kth paired BSs, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
min
{xki,n≥0}
2∑
i=1
Pki (Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n)
s.t. Dki,n − xki,n + xkı¯,n ≤ D
max
ki
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
(25)
By solving problem (25), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The optimal load sharing solutions be-
tween the two MNOs’ kth paired BSs, denoted by x∗∗k1,n and
x∗∗k2,n, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, are given as follows depending on the
BSs’ loads.
• Case I: any of the two BSs can support their total wireless
traffic load, i.e., Dmaxki ≥ Dk1,n + Dk2,n, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
In this case, suppose that the total energy consumption
with BS ki sleeping is no higher than that with BS
kı¯ sleeping (i.e., akı¯(Dk1,n + Dk2,n) + bkı¯ + cki ≤
aki(Dk1,n+Dk2,n)+bki+ckı¯). Then it is optimal for BS
ki to offload all its traffic to BS kı¯, i.e., x∗∗ki,n = Dki,n
and x∗∗kı¯,n = 0, such that BS ki is turned into sleep mode.
• Case II: only BS kı¯ can support their total wireless
traffic load while the other BS ki cannot, i.e., Dmaxki ≤
Dk1,n +Dk2,n ≤ D
max
kı¯
. In this case, if the total energy
consumption with BS ki sleeping is lower than that with
both BSs active and BS kı¯ offloading the maximum
traffic to BS ki, i.e., akı¯(Dk1,n +Dk2,n) + bkı¯ + cki <
akiD
max
ki
+ bki + akı¯(Dk1,n+Dk2,n−D
max
ki
)+ bkı¯ , then
it is optimal for BS ki to offload all its traffic to BS kı¯,
i.e., x∗∗ki,n = Dki,n and x
∗∗
kı¯,n
= 0, such that BS ki can be
turned into sleep mode. Otherwise, it is optimal for BS kı¯
to offload the maximum traffic to BS ki, i.e., x∗∗ki,n = 0
and x∗∗kı¯,n = D
max
kı¯
−Dki,n, with both BSs active.
• Case III: neither of the two BSs can support their total
data traffic load, i.e., Dk1,n+Dk2,n > Dmaxki , ∀ ∈ {1, 2}.
In this case, suppose that BS ki is no more energy
efficient than BS kı¯, i.e., aki ≥ akı¯ , then it is optimal
for BS ki to offload the maximum traffic to BS kı¯, i.e.,
x∗∗ki,n = D
max
kı¯
− Dki,n and x∗∗kı¯,n = 0, with both BSs
active.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2) Optimal Real-Time Energy Group Buying Solution: With
the optimal load sharing obtained in Proposition 4.1, it remains
to obtain the aggregated real-time energy buying and selling
amounts GBn and GSn for the two MNOs. Substituting {x∗∗ki,n}
into problem (21), then we have
C∗∗TC,n(Gn) = min
GBn≥0,G
S
n≥0
αnGn + α
B
nG
B
n − α
S
nG
S
n
s.t. Gn +G
B
n −G
S
n ≥
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
.
(26)
Problem (26) has a similar structure as problem (8), for which
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: The optimal solution to problem (26) is given
by
GB∗∗n (Gn)
=max
( 2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
−Gn, 0
)
(27)
GS∗∗n (Gn)
=max
(
Gn −
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
, 0
)
,
(28)
which achieves the minimum total energy cost of the two
MNOs as
C∗∗TC,n(Gn) =

(αn − α
B
n )Gn + α
B
n
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
,
if Gn ≤
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
(αn − α
S
n)Gn + α
S
n
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
,
if Gn >
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)
.
(29)
Here, C∗∗TC,n(Gn) is convex as a function of Gn over Gn ≥ 0.
9Proof: This lemma can be similarly proved as Lemma
3.1, for which the proof is omitted for brevity.
From Lemma 4.1, it is observed that the two fully-
cooperative MNOs make the real-time energy group buying
decision by comparing the aggregated day-ahead energy com-
mitment versus the real-time total energy demand. This is
similar to the real-time energy trading for non-cooperatively
operated MNOs in Lemma 3.1, except that the total energy
demand here is reshaped thanks to the wireless load sharing.
C. Day-Ahead Energy Group Buying in Stage I
After obtaining the optimal load sharing {x∗∗ki,n} as well as
the real-time energy group buying GB∗∗n (Gn) and GS∗∗n (Gn)
in stage II, we then investigate stage I to obtain the optimal
day-ahead energy group buying {Gn} to solve problem (20).
Note that problem (20) has a very similar structure as
problem (7) in the non-cooperative case in Section III. There-
fore, problem (20) is indeed convex provided that C∗∗TC,n(Gn)
is a convex function in Gn ≥ 0 under any given δBn ’s,
δSn ’s, and ξki,n’s, as shown in Lemma 4.1. As a result,
problem (20) can be similarly solved by the stochastic sub-
gradient method as that for solving problem (7) by replacing
{Gi,n} and
{
ζi,n =
K∑
k=1
(akiDki,n + bki)
}
in Section III-B as
{Gn} and
{
ζn =
2∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Pki
(
Dki,n − x
∗∗
ki,n
+ x∗∗kı¯,n
)}
here,
respectively.6 For brevity, we omit the detailed derivation of
solving problem (20), and let its optimal solution be denoted
by {G∗∗n }. Therefore, the optimal day-ahead energy group
buying solution has been obtained.
As compared to the optimal day-ahead energy commitment
in the non-cooperative case in Section III, the optimal day-
ahead energy group buying here has taken into account the
potential energy demand reduction due to the wireless load
sharing, thus reducing the energy commitment and leading to
significant total energy cost saving, as will be shown in the
simulation results in Section VI.
V. REPEATED NASH BARGAINING FOR SELFISH MNOS’
COOPERATION
In the previous section, we have considered the fully-
cooperative case when the two MNOs minimize their total
energy cost with the energy group buying and wireless load
sharing implemented, where one MNO offloading more traffic
may achieve large energy cost saving while the other MNO
may be burdened with extra traffic. In practice, MNOs may
belong to different entities and are self-interested in minimiz-
ing their individual energy costs. In this case, the above full
cooperation with energy group buying and load sharing does
not apply, and the two MNOs will reach the non-cooperative
benchmark.
6Note that during computing the approximate subgradient of
E
(
C∗∗TC,n(Gn)
)
, we need to update the optimal load sharing {x∗∗
ki,n
} for
each of the M randomly generated samples of wireless traffic prediction
errors
{
ξ
(m)
ki,n
}
,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
To overcome this issue, in this section we develop a novel
incentive scheme, namely repeated Nash bargaining scheme,7
to motivate the collaboration between the two MNOs. In this
scheme, the two MNOs negotiate about the energy group buy-
ing and load sharing, such that the energy cost reduction can be
fairly shared between them. The negotiation between MNOs
is assisted by the aggregator and implemented repeatedly both
in day-ahead and at each time slot in real-time. Specifically,
to maximize the flexibility of the MNOs’ energy cost sharing
and thus improve their cooperation incentive, we consider that
the two MNOs implement monetary payments with each other
at each time slot in real-time. Let the payment from MNO
i ∈ {1, 2} to the other MNO ı¯ be denoted by pii,n ≥ 0 in time
slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.8 Accordingly, the energy cost of MNO
i in time slot n can be re-expressed as
C¯i,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}) = αnGi,n + α
B
nG
B
i,n
− αSnG
S
i,n + pii,n − piı¯,n, i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(30)
With the monetary payments, we then describe the repeated
bargaining between the two MNOs in detail as follows.
• Stage I (day-ahead bargaining): The two MNOs negoti-
ate about the day-ahead energy group buying (i.e., {Gn})
and how to share the aggregated energy commitments
between them (i.e., {Gi,n} with G1,n+G2,n = Gn, ∀n ∈
{1, . . . , N} in (16)), by taking into account the potential
real-time cooperation benefit. Suppose that the expected
sum energy cost of MNO i over the N time slots is
denoted by E
(
N∑
n=1
C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n})
)
, where C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n})
represents the resulting energy cost of MNO i in time slot
n under given {Gi,n}, which is based on the real-time
bargaining at stage II as will be specified later (see (36)).9
Then the payoff of MNO i in day-ahead is defined as the
expected energy cost reduction achieved by the energy
group buying and wireless load sharing, i.e.,
UDayi ({Gi,n}) = E
( N∑
n=1
C∗i,n(G
∗
i,n)
)
− E
( N∑
n=1
C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n})
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}, (31)
where E
(∑N
n=1 C
∗
i,n(G
∗
i,n)
)
denotes the minimum ex-
pected sum energy cost of MNO i achieved by the
optimal non-cooperative energy purchase in Section III.
• Stage II (real-time bargaining from time slot 1 to N ):
Under given day-ahead energy commitment (i.e., {Gi,n})
and the corresponding day-ahead energy group buying
7Please refer to [33] for an introduction about the two-person bargaining
framework established by Nash.
8Note that the monetary payments have been commonly adopted in the
literature to facilitate the revenue/payoff sharing among different parties
(see e.g. [16]). Here, the money exchange between the two MNOs can be
performed daily by aggregating the payments over the whole day of N time
slots, thus minimizing the implementation complexity.
9We use the superscript ⋆ to denote the repeated Nash bargaining solution
in this section, to distinguish from the superscript ∗ for the non-cooperative
case in Section III and ∗∗ for the fully-cooperative case in Section IV.
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(i.e., {Gn = G1,n + G2,n}), in real-time the two
MNOs negotiate independently over each time slot n ∈
{1, . . . , N} about
– the real-time energy group buying (i.e., GBn and GSn),
– how to share the aggregated energy trading amounts
(i.e., {GBi,n} and {GSi,n} with GB1,n + GB2,n = GBn
and GS1,n +GS2,n = GSn in (17) and (18)),
– the wireless load sharing (i.e., {xki,n}),
– and the inter-MNO payment (i.e., {pii,n}).
The payoff of MNO i in time slot n is defined as the
energy cost reduction, i.e.,
UReali,n (Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n})
=C∗i,n(Gi,n)− C¯i,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}), i ∈ {1, 2},
(32)
where C¯i,n(Gi,n, GBi,n, GSi,n, {pii,n}) denotes the energy
cost of MNO i with the real-time energy group buy-
ing and load sharing employed as given in (30), and
C∗i,n(Gi,n) denotes the minimum energy cost of MNO i
achieved by the optimal non-cooperative real-time energy
trading in Section III-A.
In the following, we use the backward induction together
with the Nash bargaining solution [33] to address the above
repeated bargaining problem, in which we first investigate the
real-time bargaining in stage II under given day-ahead energy
group buying, and then study the day-ahead bargaining in stage
I.
A. Real-Time Bargaining in Stage II
First, we investigate the real-time bargaining between the
two MNOs in stage II, under given day-ahead energy com-
mitments {Gi,n} and the according day-ahead energy group
buying {Gn = G1,n + G2,n}. Since the MNOs negotiate
with each other independently over different time slots, we
consider a particular time slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} without loss of
generality.
In particular, each MNO i aims to maximize its
own energy cost reduction, or equivalently, the payoff
UReali,n (Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}). Such a negotiation can be
formulated as a two-person bargaining problem [33], in which
MNO 1 and MNO 2 correspond to the two players of interest.
The two MNOs can either reach an agreement on the real-time
energy group buying and load sharing to achieve the payoffs{
UReali,n (Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n})
}
, or fail to reach any agree-
ments (i.e., operating as in the non-cooperative benchmark) to
result in zero payoffs.
The reasonable bargaining solution has been characterized
by Nash in [33] to achieve Pareto efficiency and symmetric
fairness. Such a solution, termed the Nash bargaining solution,
can be obtained by solving the following problem
max
GBn ,G
S
n,{G
B
i,n
,GS
i,n
,xki,n,πi,n}
UReal1,n (G1,n, G
B
1,n, G
S
1,n, {pii,n})
· UReal2,n (G2,n, G
B
2,n, G
S
2,n, {pii,n}) (33)
s.t. (17), (18), (15), (22), and (23)
UReali,n (Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (34)
GBi,n ≥ 0, G
S
i,n ≥ 0, pii,n ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (35)
Here, the constraints (17) and (18) specify the sharing of real-
time energy group buying between MNOs. The constraints
(15), (22), and (23) specify the feasible sets of the real-time
energy group buying GBn and GSn and load sharing {xki,n}.
The constraints in (34) ensure that in the case of agreement,
the payoff at each MNO is no smaller than that without any
agreement.
Though problem (33) is non-convex due to the non-
convexity of the constraint (15), it can still be optimally solved
by exploiting the optimal solution to problem (21) for the
full cooperation. Let the optimal solution to problem (33)
be denoted by GB⋆n , GS⋆n , {GB⋆i,n}, {GS⋆i,n}, {x⋆ki,n}, and {pi
⋆
i,n}.
Then the following proposition follows.
Proposition 5.1: The optimal real-time energy group buy-
ing and load sharing solutions to problem (33) are given
by GB⋆n = GB∗∗n (Gn), GS⋆n = GS∗∗n (Gn), and x⋆ki,n =
x∗∗ki,n, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, where G
B∗∗
n (Gn),
GS∗∗n (Gn), and x∗∗ki,n are the optimal solution to problem
(21) under given Gn = G1,n +G2,n. Substituting GB⋆n , GS⋆n ,
and {x⋆ki,n} into problem (33), then the optimization of
{GB⋆i,n}, {G
S⋆
i,n}, and {pi⋆i,n} corresponds to a convex opti-
mization problem, which can be solved via standard convex
optimization techniques such as CVX [34]. Accordingly, the
resulting energy cost of MNO i is given by
C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n}) = C¯i,n(Gi,n, G
B⋆
i,n , G
S⋆
i,n, {pi
⋆
i,n})
=
C∗∗TC,n(Gn)
2
+
C∗i,n(Gi,n)− C
∗
ı¯,n(Gı¯,n)
2
, i ∈ {1, 2},
(36)
where C∗∗TC,n(Gn) given in (29) is the minimum total energy
cost of the two MNOs in the full cooperation under the
day-ahead energy group buying Gn, and C∗i,n(Gi,n) is the
the minimum energy cost of MNO i in the non-cooperative
benchmark under the day-ahead energy commitment Gi,n.
Proof: See Appendix C.
B. Day-Ahead Bargaining in Stage I
After obtaining the real-time Nash bargaining solution in
stage II, we next investigate the day-ahead bargaining between
the two MNOs in stage I, where they negotiate about the
day-ahead energy group buying (i.e., {Gn}) as well as the
commitment sharing (i.e., {Gi,n}), so as to minimize their
individual expected sum energy costs over the N time slots.
Such a negotiation is formulated as another two-person bar-
gaining problem as follows.
• Day-ahead energy group buying agreement. When the
two MNOs reach an agreement on the day-ahead energy
group buying, they agree to make an aggregated energy
commitment to minimize their expected total energy cost
as in the case of full cooperation, i.e., G⋆n = G∗∗n , ∀n ∈
{1, . . . , N} and accordingly
G1,n +G2,n = G
∗∗
n , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
In this case, by substituting (36) into (31) and replacing
{Gn} as {G
∗∗
n }, the payoff of MNO i ∈ {1, 2} in time
11
slot n ∈ {1, . . . , N} can be re-expressed as
UDayi ({Gi,n})
=E
( N∑
n=1
C∗i,n(G
∗
i,n)
)
− E
( N∑
n=1
(
C∗∗TC,n(G
∗∗
n )
2
+
C∗i,n(Gi,n)− C
∗
ı¯,n(Gı¯,n)
2
))
=Υi +
1
2
N∑
n=1
(
E
(
C∗ı¯,n(Gı¯,n)
)
− E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
))
,
(37)
where Υi = E
( N∑
n=1
C∗i,n(G
∗
i,n)
)
−
1
2
E
( N∑
n=1
C∗∗TC,n(G
∗∗
n )
)
is a constant.
• Day-ahead disagreement. When the two MNOs fail to
reach any agreement in day-ahead, they will operate
independently as in the non-cooperative case in both day-
ahead and real-time. In this case, both MNOs achieve zero
payoffs.
For the day-ahead negotiation, the desirable Nash bargaining
solution can be obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
{Gi,n}
UDay1 ({Gi,n}) · U
Day
2 ({Gi,n}) (38)
s.t. UDayi ({Gi,n}) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (39)
G1,n +G2,n = G
∗∗
n , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (40)
where (39) ensures that in the case of agreement, the payoff
at each MNO is no smaller than that without any agreements,
and (40) specifies the MNOs’ energy commitment sharing of
the day-ahead group buying.
Note that the function C∗i,n(Gi,n)’s (and thus
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
’s), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are all
convex functions (see (11)), and as a result, problem (38)
is non-convex in general. This, together with the fact
that E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
cannot be computed exactly, makes
problem (38) very difficult to be solved optimally. To
overcome this issue, we make the following approximation
on E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
:
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
≈


(αn − α
B
n )Gi,n + α
B
n
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki),
if Gi,n ≤
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
(αn − α
S
n)Gi,n + α
S
n
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki),
if Gi,n >
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
(41)
≈(αn − α
B
n )Gi,n + α
B
n
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki). (42)
where in (41) the predicted wireless traffic D¯ki,n’s are treated
as the exact ones by ignoring the prediction errors, and in (42)
the case of Gi,n >
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki) is omitted based
on the observation that the day-ahead energy commitment
Gi,n with load sharing is highly likely to be smaller than the
predicted energy demand
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n+ bki) without load
sharing.
Using the approximation in (42) to replace
E
(
C∗i,n(Gi,n)
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, problem
(38) then becomes a convex optimization problem, which can
thus be solved by standard convex optimization techniques
such as CVX [34]. Let the solution obtained accordingly at
the two MNOs be denoted by {G⋆i,n} for the N time slots.
By combining {G⋆i,n} and {G⋆n}, the day-ahead bargaining
solution has been finally obtained.
Despite that a sub-optimal approach (with the approxima-
tion in (42)) has been used to solve problem (38), we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2: Our day-ahead bargaining solution can
achieve Pareto optimal energy costs at the two MNOs.
Proof: This proposition holds due to the fact that by
setting the day-ahead energy group buying as G⋆n = G∗∗n , ∀n ∈
{1, . . . , N}, the day-ahead bargaining solution can always
obtain the minimum expected total energy cost for the two
MNOs.
Besides the Pareto optimality, our day-ahead bargaining
solution can also ensure the fairness of energy cost reduction
between the two MNOs, as will be shown in the simulation
results next.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to compare
the performances of the non-cooperative benchmark, the full
cooperation, and the repeated Nash bargaining scheme in
terms of the MNOs’ energy costs. We consider that there
are K = 500 LTE macro BSs deployed by each of the two
MNOs, and the one day horizon of our interest consists of
N = 48 time slots each with a length of 30 minutes. For
LTE macro BSs, the maximum average supportable data rate
throughput for each BS is set to be Dmaxki = D
max = 150
Mbps,10 and the power consumption parameters are set as
aki = 12 Watt (W)/Mbps, bki = 1200 W, and cki = 30
W, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2} [9]. Furthermore, we use
the normalized wireless traffic profiles over one day in Fig. 4,
denoted by {θn}, as a reference to generate the wireless traffic
for the BSs in our simulations. Based on {θn}, we generate
the real-time wireless traffic at BS ki as Dki,n = χkiθn, ∀n ∈
{1, . . . , N}, where the amplitude χki is a random variable
as will be specified later. We randomly generate the wireless
traffic prediction error ξki,n following a uniform distribution
over the interval [−0.4Dki,n, 0.4Dki,n]. As for energy prices,
we use the day-ahead energy price {αn} as well as real-
time energy buying and selling prices {αBn } and {αSn} over
10The average downlink data rate throughput in one LTE cell is reported
to be about 50 Mbps with a bandwidth of 20 MHz and 4× 4 multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) employed. Assuming there are three sectors at each
BS, we use Dmax = 150 Mbps for the convenience of analysis.
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Fig. 6. The average per-hour total energy cost of the two MNOs over one
day under symmetric wireless traffic.
one day as shown in Fig. 3. The energy price prediction
errors δBn and δSn are set to be random variables following
uniform distributions over the intervals [−0.1αBn , 0.1αBn ] and
[−0.1αSn, 0.1α
S
n ], respectively. Note that the specific wireless
traffic and energy price prediction errors are set here for sim-
ulation, while consistent results can be obtained under other
parameter values. We conduct 100 independent realizations to
obtain the results in this section.
A. The Case with Symmetric Wireless Traffic
In Figs. 6 and 7, we consider that the two MNOs have
symmetric wireless traffic, in which the amplitude of traffic
pattern χki ’s, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2}, are generated as
uniformly distributed random variables over the continuous
interval [0.1Dmax, 0.9Dmax]. Fig. 6 shows the total energy
cost of the two MNOs under the full cooperation as compared
to that under the non-cooperative benchmark. It is observed
that during the lightly-loaded periods (e.g., hours 1-8), more
significantly total energy cost reductions are achieved as
compared to the heavily-loaded periods (e.g., hours 12-18).
This is due to the fact that during lightly-loaded periods, it is
more likely that activating one BS is sufficient to satisfy the
total wireless traffic demands over each sub-area, and thus the
other BS can be turned into sleep mode to save power. It is
calculated that over the whole day of N = 48 time slots, the
full cooperation achieves an average of 22.81% energy cost
reduction as compared to the non-cooperative benchmark.
Fig. 7 shows the individual energy costs at the two MNOs
under the non-cooperative benchmark and the repeated Nash
bargaining scheme, respectively. Note that the repeated Nash
bargaining scheme achieves the same total energy costs for the
two MNOs as the full cooperation, and thus we have not shown
the full cooperation in this figure. It is observed that under
both the non-cooperative benchmark and the repeated Nash
bargaining scheme, the achieved energy costs at the two MNOs
have very similar patterns, given the fact that their wireless
traffic demands are symmetric. Over the whole day of N = 48
time slots, the sum energy costs at the two MNOs under the
repeated Nash bargaining are calculated to be US$ 648.88
and US$ 646.53, respectively. As compared to the sum energy
costs US$ 839.35 and US$ 838.86 under the non-cooperative
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Fig. 7. The average per-hour energy cost at each of the two MNOs over one
day under symmetric wireless traffic.
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Fig. 8. The average per-hour total energy cost of the two MNOs over one
day under asymmetric wireless traffic.
benchmark, 22.69% and 22.92% energy cost reductions are
achieved by the two MNOs, respectively.
B. The Case with Asymmetric Wireless Traffic
In Figs. 8 and 9, we consider that the wireless traffic de-
mands at the two MNOs are asymmetric, i.e., the wireless data
traffic at MNO 2 is lighter than that at MNO 1. Specifically,
we generate the amplitude of traffic pattern χk1 ’s for MNO 1,
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, as uniformly distributed random variables
over the continuous interval [0.1Dmax, 0.9Dmax], and χk2 ’s
for MNO 2 as uniformly distributed random variables over
[0.05Dmax, 0.45Dmax]. Note that each of the two MNOs is
assumed to have the same number of K = 500 BSs, which
may correspond to the scenario when they share the same
cellular infrastructures (cell sites) [26]. When the two MNOs
deploy BSs individually, the MNO with lower traffic load
may deploy less BSs with increased coverage. In this case,
the implementation of the energy group buying with wireless
load sharing requires more sophisticated inter-MNO traffic
offloading (e.g., each BS in the lightly loaded MNO may
share traffic with multiple neighboring BSs in the other heavily
loaded MNO), which, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper and will be left for our future work.
Fig. 8 shows the total energy cost of the two MNOs
under the non-cooperative benchmark and the full cooperation,
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Fig. 9. The average per-hour energy cost at each of the two MNOs over one
day under asymmetric wireless traffic.
respectively. It is observed that full cooperation achieves
considerable total cost reduction over the whole day, even
during the relatively heavily-loaded hours 12-18. This is due
to the fact that MNO 2 is more lightly-loaded and thus its BSs
are highly likely to be turned into sleep mode even during the
hours 12-18. Over the whole day, 31.72% total energy cost
reduction is achieved by the full cooperation as compared to
the non-cooperative benchmark.
Fig. 9 shows the individual energy costs at the two MNOs
under the non-cooperative benchmark and the repeated Nash
bargaining scheme, respectively. Under the non-cooperative
benchmark, it is observed that MNO 2 has lower energy costs
than MNO 1 over all the 48 time slots, which is consistent with
their wireless traffic demands. In contrast, under the repeated
Nash bargaining scheme, it is observed that over the 48 time
slots, the energy cost patterns of MNO 1 and MNO 2 fluctuate
considerably. For example, MNO 1 achieves more significant
energy cost reductions than MNO 2 during hours 1-4, whereas
the opposite is true during hour 12. The reason is that during
the day-ahead bargaining in stage I (see Section V-B), the
two MNOs negotiate to minimize their sum energy costs over
N time slots as a whole, and therefore, their energy costs
at each time slot may fluctuate. Over the whole day, the sum
energy costs at the two MNOs are computed to be US$ 548.13
and US$ 500.05 under the repeated Nash bargaining scheme,
versus US$ 840.47 and US$ 694.75 under the non-cooperative
benchmark. Accordingly, 34.78% and 28.02% energy cost
reductions are achieved by the two MNOs, respectively.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we considered cellular networks in the emerg-
ing hybrid electricity market, and proposed a new approach
named energy group buying with load sharing to reduce
the energy costs of MNOs via exploiting their collaboration
benefit. To motivate self-interested MNOs to cooperate, we
further developed a novel repeated Nash bargaining scheme,
in which the MNOs negotiate about the energy group buying
and load sharing in both day-ahead and real-time, so as to
fairly share the energy cost reduction. The repeated Nash
bargaining scheme is shown to achieve the Pareto optimal and
fair energy cost reductions for the MNOs. With the emerging
5G cellular and smart grid systems, it is our hope that this
paper can open a new avenue towards how to jointly utilize
new communication techniques (e.g., wireless load sharing)
and smart grid techniques (e.g., energy group buying) to
further improve the energy cost efficiency for future green
cellular networks.
Note that our results in this paper are extendable to the
scenario with more than two MNOs. When these MNOs
belong to the same entity, they should be grouped all together
for energy group buying and wireless loading sharing. How
to decide the BSs’ active/sleep modes and the wireless load
sharing among them in each sub-area is a challenging task.
On the other hand, when these MNOs belong to different
entities, they should further engage in group bargaining [36]
(instead of one-to-one bargaining in this paper) to fairly share
the potential collaboration benefit achieved by energy group
buying with wireless loading sharing. It is important but chal-
lenging to design the bargaining protocol among these MNOs
(e.g., sequential or concurrent bargaining [16]), depending on
individual bargaining power.
It is also worth pointing out that our proposed energy group
buying with load sharing can be implemented in emerging
wireless heterogeneous networks (HetNets) with densely de-
ployed small cell BSs such as pico- and femto-BSs, by care-
fully pairing them via taking into account their diverse energy
consumption, coverage, and communication capabilities. In
particular, wireless load sharing between different types of
BSs (e.g., between macro and small cell BSs) can help further
improve the energy cost efficiency of HetNets. Since small
cell BSs are often located within the covered sub-areas of
macro BSs and need not take care of the coverage, paired
small cell BSs from different MNOs can be turned into sleep
mode at the same time by offloading their traffic to macro BSs.
How to optimize the inter-MNO wireless load sharing among
different BS types together with the energy group buying is
an interesting issue worth pursuing in future work.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Note that ζi,n =
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n+ bki)+Ξi,n with Ξi,n =∑K
k=1(akiξki,n). Therefore, given the fact that φki,n(ξki,n) =
φki,n(−ξki,n), it follows that fi,n(
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki) +
Ξi,n) = fi,n(
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki) − Ξi,n). Accordingly, it
follows that ∫ ∞
∑
K
k=1(aki D¯ki,n+bki )
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n
=
∫ ∑K
k=1(aki D¯ki,n+bki )
0
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n. (43)
From (43) and (14), we have
gi,n
(
K∑
k=1
(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
)
=(2αn − α¯
S
n − α¯
B
n )
∫ ∞
∑
K
k=1(aki D¯ki,n+bki )
fi,n(ζi,n)dζi,n.
(44)
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From (44), it follows that when αn = (αBn + αSn)/2, we
have gi,n
(∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
)
= 0, and accordingly the
optimal solution is given as G∗i,n =
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki).
Similarly, if αn > (αBn + αSn)/2 or αn < (αBn + αSn)/2,
then it follows that gi,n
(∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
)
> 0 or
gi,n
(∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki)
)
< 0. As a result, we have
G∗i,n <
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n + bki) or G
∗
i,n >
∑K
k=1(akiD¯ki,n +
bki), respectively. Therefore, this proposition is proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
We prove this proposition by considering the three cases
one by one.
First, consider Case I when Dmaxki ≥ Dk1,n +Dk2,n, ∀i ∈
{1, 2}. In this case, it can be shown that it is optimal for the
two BSs to offload their total traffic loads into one of them such
that the other can be turned into sleep mode to save energy,
since otherwise higher non-transmission power is consumed.
Based on this observation, the optimal solution in this case
can be obtained by comparing the energy consumption under
the two possible solutions. The first possible solution is for
BS k1 to offload all the traffic into BS k2 (i.e., xk1,n = Dk1,n
and xk2,n = 0), such that BS k1 can be turned to sleep mode,
for which the total energy consumption of the two BSs is
ak2(Dk1,n +Dk2,n) + bk2 + ck1 . Similarly, the other possible
solution is xk1,n = 0 and xk2,n = Dk2,n, for which the total
energy consumption of the two BSs is ak1(Dk1,n +Dk2,n) +
bk1+ck2 . By comparing the two values of energy consumption,
the solution in Case I is proved.
Next, consider Case II when Dmaxki ≤ Dk1,n + Dk2,n ≤
Dmaxkı¯ . In this case, it can be shown that it suffices for us to
consider the following two possible solutions. The first possi-
ble solution is for BS ki to offload all its traffic to BS kı¯ (i.e.,
xki,n = Dki,n and xkı¯,n = 0), such that BS ki can be turned
into sleep, for which the total energy consumption of the two
BSs is akı¯(Dk1,n + Dk2,n) + bkı¯ + cki . The other possible
solution is for BS kı¯ to offload an xkı¯,n = Dmaxki − Dkı¯,n
amount of traffic to BS ki (and xki,n = 0), such that BS ki
is fully loaded, for which the total energy consumption of the
two BSs is akiDmaxki +bki +akı¯(Dk1,n+Dk2,n−D
max
ki
)+bkı¯ .
By comparing the two possible solutions, we have the optimal
solution in Case II.
Finally, consider Case III with Dk1,n+Dk2,n > Dmaxki , ∀i ∈
{1, 2}. In this case, no BSs can be turned into sleep, and thus
it is desirable for the two BSs to offload their wireless traffic
to the BS with lower transmission power consumption (ac-
cordingly, BS ki with aki ≤ akı¯). Based on this observation,
the solution in Case III can be easily obtained.
By combining the above three cases, this proposition is
verified.
C. Proof of Proposition 5.1
First, we show the optimal solution to problem (33). It
is evident that under Gn = G1,n + G2,n, the optimal
solution to (21) (i.e., GB∗∗n (Gn), GS∗∗n (Gn), and {x∗∗ki,n})
is also feasible solutions of GBn , GSn , and {xki,n} to
problem (33). Furthermore, from (17) and (18), we have∑2
i=1 C¯i,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}) = CTC,n(Gn, G
B
n , G
S
n).
By using this together with the fact that the total energy
cost can be perfectly shared between the two MNOs due to
the inter-MNO payment {pii,n}, it follows that GB∗∗n (Gn),
GS∗∗n (Gn), and {x∗∗ki,n}, which minimize the total energy
cost
∑2
i=1 C¯i,n(Gi,n, G
B
i,n, G
S
i,n, {pii,n}) of the two MNOs,
are indeed optimal for problem (33), i.e., GB⋆n = GB∗∗n (Gn),
GS⋆n = G
S∗∗
n (Gn), and x⋆ki,n = x
∗∗
ki,n
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, i ∈
{1, 2}. Substituting GB⋆n , GS⋆n , and {x⋆ki,n} into problem (33),
it can be easily shown that the optimization of {GBi,n}, {GSi,n},
and {pii,n} corresponds to a convex optimization problem.
Next, we obtain the resulting energy cost {C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n})}.
As shown above, at the Nash bargaining solution, the resulting
total energy cost at the two MNOs is equal to that achieved
in the full cooperation (i.e., C⋆1,n({Gi,n}) + C⋆2,n({Gi,n}) =
C∗∗TC,n(Gn) with Gn = G1,n + G2,n), and the total en-
ergy cost C∗∗TC,n(Gn) can be perfectly shared between the
two MNOs. Therefore, it is evident from problem (33) that{
C¯⋆i,n({Gi,n})
}2
i=1
can be obtained as the optimal solution of
{C¯i,n}
2
i=1 to the following convex optimization problem:
max
{C¯i,n}
(C∗1,n(G1,n)− C¯1,n) · (C
∗
2,n(G2,n)− C¯2,n)
s.t. C¯1,n + C¯2,n = C
∗∗
TC,n(Gn)
C∗i,n(Gi,n)− C¯i,n ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
Since C∗∗TC,n(Gn) ≤ C∗1,n(G1,n) + C∗2,n(G2,n) always holds
thanks to the cost reduction achieved by load sharing, (36)
can be obtained by solving the above problem. Therefore, this
proposition is proved.
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